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Modernization and Centre-Left Dilemmas in Greece:  
the Revenge of the Underdogs 
 
 
1. Introduction 
After dominating Greek politics for over 20 years (1981-2004), PASOK seems 
to have entered a period of decline which has reached alarming levels after the 
2007 election. It has faired poorly, or worse, in the 1998, 2002 and 2006 local 
elections, the 1999 and 2004 elections for the European parliament, and, most 
significantly, in the 2004 and 2007 parliamentary elections. With the benefit of 
hindsight the narrow victory in the 2000 general election seems no more than a 
blip to the overall trend. This problematic performance is linked to a 
multiplicity of causes including PASOK’s record in government, the all-too-
close identification of party and state, the (often shady) role of party officials 
within both central and local state institutions, and the difficulty in meeting the 
challenges of globalization and European integration. However we shall argue 
here that a crucial factor has been the set of ideas that the centre-left has had at 
its disposal with respect not only to understanding the problems of Greek 
society, but also with respect to the role of the centre-left as part of the answer 
to such problems. These ideas, that can be grouped around the strategy of 
modernization were, we shall argue, particularly inappropriate for a centre-left 
party in Greece. The tendency to conceptualize development in terms of a clash 
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between the “new” and the “old”, to ignore the extent to which neoliberalism 
involves a strategy for the restoration of class power, and to see marginalized 
groups merely as a problem to be overcome rather than part of any solution has 
entailed ignoring the sources of strength of the centre-left and impaired 
constructive thinking about alternatives to the general rightward shift in 
politics. Moreover it has hampered the centre-left’s ability to come to terms 
with its own declining hegemony. 
In recent years there has been a significant reconsideration of the role of 
economic ideas, and in particular their relationship to both interests and 
institutions. As Mark Blyth (2002) has recently argued ideas are particularly 
important in moments of uncertainty when established institutions do not seem 
to be working very well1. Such moments, often associated with large or small 
crises of capitalism (in the inter-war period, in the 1970s, and perhaps now) 
need to be interpreted by the various economic and political actors. It is here 
that ideas come into play. For instance the ideas that have been crucial to 
neoliberalism (monetarism, public choice and so on) became dominant exactly 
because they were able to give an interpretation to the decline, after the late 
1960s, of the “golden age” of capitalism. These ideas suggested that the main 
problem in most economies is inflation rather than unemployment, that the 
state has the tendency to strangle private initiative, and that the welfare state 
weakens the incentives that workers face in the labour market. Such 
interpretations are not merely of academic interest, for they have the ability to 
                                                 
1
 Uncertainty here is used in its Knightian sense; that is a situation, often unique, where it is difficult to 
work out the probabilities of various outcomes (See Blyth, 2002, pp. 42-44). 
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become a materialist force that allows people to understand reality (even 
concerning the basic causal relationships that operate within the economy – 
between, say, government deficits and inflation). 
By doing this they help people clarify where their interests lie. Thus in the late 
1970s monetarist ideas were instrumental in convincing many capitalists that 
their interests no longer rested with consensual arrangements with labour and 
the corporatist institutions that had underpinned such arrangements in the post-
war period. A little later, under the influence of similar ideas, important 
sections of the working class shifted to the right – the Reagan Democrats 
constituting the paradigmatic case. Of course such a shift reflected materialist 
interests, in that many skilled workers were facing higher taxes with lesser 
benefits2. But this was not seen by them as a result of the attempt by the 
dominant classes to restore their economic and political power. On the whole 
they saw their deteriorating economic circumstances through the lenses of 
neoliberal ideas – large state, subsidies to benefit scroungers, and so on. So, as 
Blyth concludes, ideas also are crucial to the formation of social coalitions and 
the institutions and policies that such coalitions promote. 
In Greece since the 1990s an influential set of ideas in favour of neoliberal 
reforms came to be understood in terms of the discourse of modernization. 
Modernizers were more prominent within PASOK, and especially under the 
leadership of Costas Simitis, but they made their mark in other parties as well. 
And this discourse is still central to the politics of PASOK under George 
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 See Blackburn (1999). 
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Papandreou3. While modernization in the Greek context is couched in terms of 
reforming an inefficient public and private sector, allowing Greece to compete 
globally and participate fully in the on-going process of European integration, 
in terms of specific measures there is very little that is not part of the standard 
package of neoliberal reforms – flexible labour markets, deregulation, 
privatization, tax cuts and so on (see Harvey, 2007). In the modernizing 
approach such measures tend to be associated with the ‘new’ as against an old 
order of statism, clientelistic politics and inward-looking development. The 
new in this context is presented as the only game in town, with the result that 
the social forces representing the old order are seen only through the 
perspective of the extent to which they are able to block the necessary reforms. 
The idea that these forces, usually seen as the losers of the market and the least 
competitive sections of Greek society, could be part of the solution, and not just 
the problem, is quite foreign to modernizing thinking. We shall argue below 
that this is deeply problematic given that the losers have traditionally formed an 
important part of PASOK’s social base. 
At one level PASOK’s problems could be understood in terms of economic 
outcomes. The economic benefits of neoliberalism at the EU level have not 
been impressive, most clearly with respect to the failure to get anywhere near 
the goals of the Lisbon strategy. While Greece has fared better in terms of 
                                                 
3
 In this respect Papandreou’s conflict after his succession to the leadership of the party in 2004 with 
certain modernizing ministers of the Simitis government should not be read as an abandonment of the 
modernization project. Papandreou, as we shall see, has a few post-modern touches to add to the 
modernizing vision, but is committed to its core elements. It is true that in the election for leader of the 
party after the disastrous electoral showing in 2007, most of the modernizing block did support 
Papandreou’s challenger Evangelos Venizelos. But the Papandreou-Venizelos struggle was not carried 
out at the level of ideology and little turned on the issue of modernization as a political strategy. 
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growth in the recent period, the results in terms of employment have not been 
impressive, and there are clear signs that this growth is not meeting the 
aspirations of PASOK’s traditional social base. Thus whilst during the PASOK 
government from 1994-1999 (which included Simitis’ first term of office) the 
wage share rose, the second Simitis government (1999-2004) presided over a 
significant fall in the wage share. This implies that during that period real wage 
increases did not match productivity increases (see Appendix A). 
Beyond immediate economic outcomes, the reform agenda in terms of a more 
flexible workforce, or proposals for reforming Greece’s problematic pension 
system, has a dynamic element pointing to an uncertain future with fewer 
benefits, casual employment and so on. That is to say neoliberal policies are 
increasingly seen by some sections of the population, and especially younger 
cohorts, not in terms of short-term stabilization policies whose success in 
reducing inflation, or the public debt, would eventually be succeeded by a 
renewed period of economic prosperity for the many, but as a permanent 
settlement in which the longer-term prospects for workers and other weak 
groups are far from encouraging. 
Thus both recent economic developments and anxiety about future prospects 
may lie behind PASOK’s loss of hegemony since the late 1990s. But the 
problem is more acute exactly because the set of ideas available to PASOK are 
not those which facilitate an understanding of its predicament. A number of 
themes will be developed in what follows to substantiate this claim. Firstly, it 
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will be argued that modernization ideas fundamentally misunderstand the 
neoliberal project. Neoliberalism does seek to restore the grounds for a 
renewed period of successful capital accumulation, but on the basis of the 
restoration of class power. It is the latter which has met with most success, as 
witnessed by the astonishing rise in inequalities in the more liberal economies. 
This fact sets very searching questions to all parties of the centre-left with 
respect to their relationship with their social base. Secondly, seeing 
modernization in terms of a conflict between the new and the old distorts many 
of the underlying processes. Such a dichotomy, we shall argue, is unable both 
to understand the past and to think strategically about the future. Thirdly, any 
approach that suggests that key elements of your social base are part of the 
problem, and not part of a solution, is an inauspicious starting point for 
building a hegemonic strategy. 
 
2. Capitalism, markets and equality 
One of the most influential accounts in Greece of the process of modernization 
in terms of a conflict between the new and the old can be found in 
Diamandouros’ reading of Greek history as a clash between two cultures4. We 
begin with this book because many of the central ideas in it are widely shared 
by modernizers and in order to show why such a dichotomy is particularly 
unhelpful for a left-of-centre party. 
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 Diamandouros’ work was originally published in English as a working paper, but was later 
republished as a book in Greek (Diamandouros, 2000). All references hereafter are to the Greek 
version, with my translation.  
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The book is firmly in the tradition of American political science and the 
modernization approach that was once influential in both political and 
economic science. The idea is that most societies will eventually converge onto 
the political, economic and social institutions of the developed west. The 
attractiveness of these institutions is rarely discussed, nor is much thought 
given to the shifting trajectory of the western ideal – is approaching Johnson’s 
‘great society’ similar to approaching the neoconservative vision of Bush the 
Younger? Given this relative indifference to ends, modernization analysis is 
more concerned with examining the obstacles in various societies to arriving at 
the western ideal. It is acknowledged that there are costs involved in this 
process of catch-up which are ‘unavoidable (and, according to many, 
necessary)’ (p. 113). In the Greek case, Diamandouros contends that those 
forces that have most to lose have attached themselves to a culture that has had 
a particular take on economics, international affairs and so on. This long-
standing culture, whose origins lie in the nineteenth century, has tended to be 
inward-looking, suspicious of foreigners, statist, anti-market, and pro-
redistribution. Moreover this “underdog” culture has been able to offer 
powerful resistance to the “reform” culture that has sought to modernize 
Greece. The clash of cultures has delayed the modernization of both society 
and the economy and led to reforms that have been half-hearted and 
incomplete. However, the reform culture, which is outward-looking and pro-
market, started gaining ground, with the help of the process of European 
integration in the 1990s and, more generally, globalisation. 
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So how has this analysis faired with the benefit of the last few years? And how 
does it relate to the decline of the hegemony not only of the modernizing 
PASOK of Simitis but also the post-Simitis PASOK of George Papandreou? 
Let us start by asking who, at the ideational level, is part of the underdog 
culture. For a start all those who are suspicious of the market system since 
central to the underdog culture is the “… deep lack of faith of this culture 
towards capitalism and the workings of the market” (p. 80). Now this on the 
face of it would seem to include large swathes of the Left over the last one 
hundred and fifty years or so. And even though more recently the Left has 
doubts about the viability of its vision of a market-free future society, there is 
still considerable support for constraining the market on both the grounds of 
equity and efficiency. Nor has there been a stop to the search for alternatives to 
models dominated by the market5. Unfortunately the latter too is enough to 
confine one to the underdog culture. Diamandouros goes on to claim that the 
underdog culture entails ‘… a view of modernization very common in late 
development societies, which represents the ambiguous relationship of this 
culture to the liberal, western model of socio-economic change and materializes 
itself historically with the tendency to search for and experiment with 
“alternative” roads for development” (p. 54, my emphasis). That the very 
search for alternatives has a negative assessment suggests that something is 
deeply flawed with this particular dualism and especially for a party of the 
centre-left where thinking of alternatives may be supposed to be a core activity. 
                                                 
5
 See for instance Elster and Moene (1989). 
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More problematic still is the stance taken towards equality. Diamandouros is 
quite clear on this issue. Growth and trickle-down are compatible with a vibrant 
reform culture but redistribution, whose goal is to bring “… the privileged 
layers closer to the level of the non privileged” (p. 79), is not. Now, given the 
extent to which views on equality have changed back and forth over the years, 
it is not clear, without further argument, why a reform culture has to be 
attached to either an egalitarian or meritocratic vision of society. A party 
seeking to appeal to the non-privileged would be unwise to dismiss 
egalitarianism lightly6. The problem with dichotomies between new and old is 
that they quickly appear to be overly tied to interpretations of a specific time 
and place. More worrying still, from the perspective of a party of the centre-
left, is the problematic nature of such a dichotomy with respect to 
understanding the future. The balance between state and market, between 
competitiveness and solidarity, and so on, is subject to the operation of the 
pendulum. Any analysis which ties itself to what is new, in any one period, 
tends to get unstuck when the contradictions of the status quo start to appear 
and the pendulum starts to change direction once more. 
 
                                                 
6
 I have discussed elsewhere (Tsakalotos, 2005) the problematic nature of the tendency of modernizers 
to support meritocracy. At the theoretical it seems to ignore the ability of the middle and upper classes 
to protect their offspring from downward social mobility, thereby limiting the number of places 
available to those with aspirations to travel in the opposite direction. At the empirical level it is the case 
that equality of opportunity is most in evidence in societies that are also characterized by equality of 
outcome. 
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3. Social Groups and Neoliberal Reforms 
In the account of Diamandouros, and in the modernization literature in general, 
dominated, exploited and marginalized groups are the objects of study but 
almost never the subjects of change. This is in stark contrast to the origins of 
social democratic hegemony in the interwar period where, in part though the 
rise of Keynesianism and the discrediting of classical economic prescriptions, 
interest organizations were seen not as the obstacles but the instruments for 
solving the economic crisis.7 It is accepted that these groups face severe 
problems in the process of development, including a loss of power and status 
and leading to a defensive strategy, which in the Greek case, Diamandouros (p. 
80) argues, entails supporting a populist agenda “… which was considered able 
to guarantee their long-run survival, ensuring their powerful representation in 
various structures, such as political parties, unions, cooperatives, the state, the 
wider public sector and the prefecture councils”. Now that such groups should 
seek institutional power cannot by itself be problematic. Rather the problem 
arises when the entrenchment of such groups leads to stagnation, poor overall 
economic performance and divergence from developments elsewhere. 
There are a number of problems with seeing the relationship between social 
groups and social change in this way. While open about the losers, most writers 
in the modernization tradition are rather circumspect about the winners of the 
strategy of liberalization, privatization and deregulation that have been pursued 
                                                 
7
 See Blyth (2002, p. 112). Brenner (2007, pp. 38-39) argues that similar considerations applied to the 
US, where the embedded liberalism of the post-war era was predicated on the social mobilisation of 
unions in the 1930s. 
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over the last twenty years or so. For while the overall economic benefits have 
been mixed, in terms of growth, productivity and employment, the restoration 
of class power has been an unmitigated success8. Whether we look at the rate of 
profit and the share of profit in national income, the share of income or wealth 
that goes to the top 5% (or even 1% or 0.1%), or the return of a rentier class, 
liberal economies have seen not only a reversal of the egalitarian trajectory of 
the first couple of decades after World War II but the reformation of a very 
powerful ruling class (appendix B provides evidence for the Greek case). And 
this prominence is not reflected only in the economic indicators of inequality 
but in the institutional changes which have crystallized the restored power (the 
right of managers to manage within firms, lighter regimes of environmental and 
social regulation etc). 
Given this, what should the potential losers do in countries when the whole 
package of neo-liberal reforms has not as yet worked through the system? 
Modernizers often think that the best solution is that the winners should be in 
position to offer the losers compensation to accept the necessary reforms9. 
Since the modernizing reforms will lead to economic efficiency and dynamism, 
the winners can compensate the losers and still be better off. Unfortunately, as 
many have argued before, this strategy is not credible. To give up power in 
institutions for compensation leads you open to future reneging from the 
compensators – once the new institutions are in place and the winners go back 
on their promise to compensate, the, by assumption less powerful, losers are 
                                                 
8
 See Pollin (2001); Dumenil and Levy (2004); Harvey (2005) and Glyn (2006). 
9
 See Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 
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hardly in a position to enforce the previous agreement. So it is not obvious that 
potential losers have any incentive to give up their power bases in the state, 
unions and local authorities10. They have an interest either in reforms that are 
neutral in their consequences for the balance of power between social groups, 
or in trading of institutions in which they are strong with other type of 
institutions which preserve their power. The idea of compensation is unlikely to 
form a basis for a non-conflict path to change. 
The fundamental problem lies with all those attempts that seek to neutralize the 
ethical and political issues around the issue of institutional change. In an earlier 
era economists and political theorists were more careful. For instance in the 
accounts of the 1970s on how to rework the post-war settlement, two solutions, 
going in radically different directions, were discussed. One entailed a market 
strategy to reduce the effects of politics on economic decision-making. The 
other was a renewed attempt at democratization and inclusion, that is, a 
reworking of the old Keynesian compromise. For many analysts at the time 
either strategy implied a political economy project with clear winners and 
losers: “Renunciation of political weaponry is an unattractive option, above all 
for groups that look to political weapons to alter the economic and political 
status quo in their favour. (In the words of an old Labour Party slogan: ‘The 
                                                 
10
 A fuller account of this argument can be found in Tsakalotos (2004). There I also argue against 
another strand of the modernizers’ argument which suggests that marginalized groups in society (the 
“outsiders”) have a lesser stake in the status quo than the “insiders” (for instance in the Greek case 
those represented by strong unions in the public sector) who are able to acquire part of the rents in an 
imperfectly competitive economy. I argue there, once again on considerations of political power, that in 
the long-run the outsiders are unlikely to be major benefactors from an assault on insider power, as the 
precarious position of these groups in the more liberal economies demonstrates. Lest it be forgotten, the 
key moments that signposted a shift of power from labour (both insiders and outsiders) in both the 
Reagan and Thatcher experiments entailed an assault on insider power (see Harvey, 2007, p. 25). 
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rich man has his money, the poor man has his politics’)” (Hirsch 1978: 269). 
Moreover “[e]fforts to depoliticize the market tend to be spurious. They usually 
entail a one-sided buttressing of profits and managerial prerogatives” (Maier 
and Lindberg 1985: 597-8). It is such buttressing that we have referred earlier 
to as the successful restoration of class power. 
In this respect the modernizers’ hostility to corporatist solutions is highly 
revealing and perfectly in tune with neoliberal thinking; for “While individuals 
are supposedly free to choose, they are not supposed to construct strong 
collective institutions (such as trade unions) as opposed to weak voluntary 
associations (like charitable organizations)” (Harvey, 2007, p. 69). While 
Diamandouros is critical of the underdog culture’s suspicion of civil society 
and intermediate institutions (p. 52), it is not clear what institutions the reform 
culture should be promoting. Certainly not corporatist ones which tend to be 
seen as undemocratic and part of the old order (p. 59)11. Thus Simitis (1989, 
pp. 71-88), who began staking out his modernizing ground in the late 1980s, 
was highly suspicious of organized interests, explicitly criticizing the supposed 
beneficial consequences claimed in both pluralist and corporatist accounts. 
Indeed for Simitis a central obstacle to modernization in Greece was precisely 
the Greek public’s penchant for not supporting reforms opposed by powerful 
vested interests (p. 83). It is not that such groups are rejected out of court, but 
that their usefulness is measured by the extent to which they support the needed 
                                                 
11
 The exception to this is when the social partners can agree on implementing the agenda of the reform 
culture (Diamandouros, 2000, p. 121 and fn 51). 
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reforms of modernization – an agenda which, we should add, they have had no 
role in determining. 
George Papandreou gave such arguments a post-modern twist. His themes of 
participatory democracy, the role of civil society and NGOs can be seen as an 
attempt to give some content to Diamandouros’ appeal to intermediate 
structures. But given Papandreou’s support for nearly the whole package of 
neoliberal reforms, both in government and opposition, and his appeal to the 
more dynamic sectors of society – the winners from the market process12 – it is 
not clear that the popular classes can expect any greater role from such a 
strategy. As a number of analysts have recently argued (Pantazopoulos, 2006; 
Belantis, 2007) Papandreou’s approach entails a disengagement with the 
traditional meaning of the term people. There is a hostility to the meaning of 
the “people” in both the sense used in the discourse of representative 
democracy and in the discourse of the Left (workers and popular classes). 
Rather the emphasis is on civil society and the needs of citizens, mediated by 
supposedly horizontal NGOs, which can cooperate with an “open” party and an 
“open” political society to promote a new agenda of change. As Belantis argues 
the contradiction here is neither that between capital and labour, nor that 
between social reforms of the Keynesian era and neoliberal reforms, but 
between a centralized state and one open to the demands of citizens. 
                                                 
12
 Consent to neoliberalism from middle classes can also be forged on the grounds of individualistic 
values and increased consumption patterns, the latter often financed by deregulated financial markets 
(Harvey, 2007, p.61). Such considerations are also relevant in Greece as the increased indebtedness of 
households over the last few years attests. But whether support from the middle classes can be acquired 
for Southern European (where the financial systems may never be able to reach the level of US and the 
UK) centre-left parties must remain in doubt. See Appendix C for a more comprehensive analysis of 
these issues. 
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How does such a conception fare with responding to the thinning out of 
democratic processes and the prominence of shady practices and corruption, 
both of which have constituted characteristic features of many capitalist 
societies in recent times? Both aspects have bedevilled PASOK, and 
Papandreou’s appeal to the “new” politics seems in part an attempt to 
dissociate the party from some of the practices that marred the last years of the 
Simitis government. Let us start with the issue of corruption. Once more the 
modernizers’ distinction between old and new is unlikely to take us very far, 
since some of the problems seem to be very much part of late modernity itself 
rather than remnants of a less developed capitalism. For it is by now fairly clear 
that the neoliberal era has spawned new while preserving old forms of 
corruption. In part this reflects the extent to which the boundaries between the 
state and corporate power have been blurred, with the increased power of 
corporations with respect to party financing and with respect to the writing, 
implementation and supervision of legislation13. In an earlier era the power of 
money in politics was met, and resolved partially at least, with the increased 
mobilisation of popular forces seeking a new political settlement based in an 
explicit shift in the balance of power between capital and labour. The post-war 
settlement sought to reject not only the recession and poverty of the inter-war 
period, but the power of money14. 
                                                 
13
 See Monbiot (2001); Harvey (2007, pp. 76-78). 
14
 See Chiber (2005). 
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A second consideration reflects the effects of financial liberalisation in which a 
seemingly ever increasing amount of resources is devoted to short-term 
financial and speculative gains rather than more productive activities – the 
interest of managers, accounting firms and shareholders in propping up the 
share price of a firm was a decisive factor driving such scandals as ENRON in 
the late 1990s. A final consideration of significance is the way deregulation has 
had to be combined with re-regulation of economic activity through a host of 
semi-independent authorities15.  
The above considerations also have a bearing on the nature and quality of 
democracy. While the relationship between capitalism and democracy has long 
been debated, it is clear in retrospect that over the twentieth century the rise of 
democracy was seen as a restraint on the market – enabling a larger range of 
values than can be expressed in the market (Jacques, 2004). Neoliberalism has 
sought to reverse much of the compromise leading to a decline in interest in the 
political process and a distrust of politicians. As Marquand (2004) pithily puts 
it if nobody listens what is the point of debate? For Marquand, this is the 
context in which to see the “return to the politics of connection, favouritism 
and patronage’ - as other values have been sidelined the distinction between 
legal, ‘dodgy but not quite illegal’, and illegal transactions between self-
interested individuals has become increasingly fuzzy. 
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 As Quiggin (2000) argues it is a paradox of our times that rent-seeking behaviour seems more 
prominent in the post-liberalization era. After all, rent-seeking, which developed as a concept from the 
public choice critique of big government, should have been more prominent in the more regulated and 
embedded past. 
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The compatibility of Papandreou’s conception of politics with very powerful 
private sector economic interests seems easier to see, than the potential of civil 
society to provide institutions amenable to the interests of the people in either 
of the two previous meanings mentioned above. His approach has been rightly 
termed anti-politics and in this there are similarities with the politics of New 
Labour in which “Blairism tends to see debate, discussion, voting, 
compromising, learning and failure – the very stuff of politics and democracy – 
as messy processes that delay decisions and create uncertainty, doubt and 
confusion” (Lawson & Leighton, 2004). 
In the modernist vision change comes from elites representing the potential 
winners of change. Whatever the descriptive merits of such a stance, it is not 
one that is likely to provide sure foundations for a left party. For hundreds of 
years the Left was inspired by individuals, and groups, who have striven 
against the commodification of labour and exclusion from the centres of power. 
True, many of these groups had at best a vague idea about how to implement 
new societies based on equality and an expanded conception of human dignity. 
But the idea that ordinary people can, and should, take matters into their own 
hands against specific classes and groups, who owe their own wealth and social 
position to the fact that others are commodities or are excluded from important 
areas of decision-making, is not something that is, as is often implied by 
modernizers, a fact of ‘traditional society’ and of no relevance to the here and 
now. It is in this sense that “The real success of the socialist tradition lies not in 
the organization of centrally planned economies but in the achievement of 
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forms of collective action, such as trade unions, cooperatives, community 
groups and political movements” (Gamble and Kelly, 1996, p. 82). As we go 
on to argue, such collective mobilisations are abandoned by centre-left parties 
at their peril. 
 
4. Misunderstanding the family-nation-religion nexus 
The abandonment of mobilisation of its social base by the centre-left explains 
why it is so ill-placed to respond to the right wing dynamic of modern 
capitalism. The experience of the US is most salient in this respect. Frank 
(2004) has recently argued that in the US the failure of the Democrats, and 
liberalism in general, can be attributed, at least in part, to a tendency not to take 
popular mobilization seriously. Tied as they are to certain powerful private 
interest groups, and reliant on such groups for campaign funding16, Democrats 
have tended to avoid ‘divisive’ issues such as taxation and redistribution, let 
alone taking on the power of corporations and financial interests. On the 
contrary, they have tended to keep a large distance from unions and other social 
movements. The idea seems to be to appeal to ‘middle America’, and hope that 
the increasing radicalisation, and extremism, of the Republicans will eventually 
lead to a victory for them. 
With economics, and issues derogatively labelled as ‘class warfare’, 
conveniently taken out of the political contest, Republicans have been free to 
                                                 
16
 On the role of corporate finance in Democratic politics see Harvey (2007, pp. 48-49) and Brenner 
(2007, p. 51). 
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campaign on a set of cultural values (the family, the rights of the unborn, and 
so on), which have appealed to the traditional social base of the Democratic 
party. Frank’s argument is that in the US it is the Right not the Left that is now 
organized to campaign at the grass roots in communities, churches, schools and 
so on. In the words of Harvey (2007, p. 51) “The political structure that 
emerged was quite simple. The Republican Party could mobilize massive 
financial resources and mobilize its popular base to vote against its material 
interests on cultural/religious grounds while the Democratic Party could not 
afford to attend to the material needs (for example for a national health-care 
system) of its traditional popular base for fear of offending capitalist class 
interests”17. 
The first lesson to be drawn from the American experience is that not taking 
seriously collective organization, and popular mobilization, does not mean that 
the right will call a truce. The tendency in Greece for the modernizers to see 
nearly all collective action as the mere representation of sectional interests has 
left PASOK similarly exposed at the political level. But the second lesson is 
that mobilisation on a cultural agenda, based on nationalism, religion or family 
values, cannot be understood in terms of remnants from the old order. Once 
again a schema that juxtaposes the old with the new tends to mislead. After all 
the cultural agenda is now of central importance to American politics which is 
supposed to be, in the modernization approach, our final resting place. 
Similarly in the Greek case, any approach that understands nationalistic 
                                                 
17
 For an account of the contradictory pulls of cultural and material considerations on voting patterns 
for Left parties see Van der Waal et. al (2007). 
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outbreaks, a harsher attitude to immigrants, the upgraded role of the Orthodox 
Church, and the general conservative attitudes of the population evidenced in 
numerous surveys as merely the remnants of the underdog culture is likely to 
be very misleading. 
It is not part of the modernization account, but the sad fact is that neoliberal 
reforms seem eminently compatible with a very conservative, often 
authoritarian, agenda. From the Republicans’ shift to neo-conservatism, to 
Sarkozy’s appeal to the racist agenda of Le Pen, to New Labour’s record on 
‘law and order’ legislation, the viability of a neoliberal agenda that is liberal in 
both its economic and social moments must remain in doubt. In part this 
reflects the rise in inequality which brings to the fore issues of social control. 
But it also reflects the contradiction between “… a seductive but alienating 
possessive individualism on the one hand and the desire for a meaningful 
collective life on the other” (Harvey, 2007, p. 69). In the American case, 
Harvey argues, the aim is for the cultural agenda to counteract the dissolving 
effect of the chaos of individual interests associated with neoliberal economic 
interventions. Neoconservatives seek to further the restoration of class power 
began by neoliberalism “But they seek legitimacy for that power, as well as 
social control through construction of a climate of consent around a coherent 
set of moral values” (Harvey, 2007, p. 83). In this light the hypothesis that a 
conservative social and cultural agenda has been the dominant way that 
neoliberal forces have sought to incorporate those sections of society with most 
to lose from economic reform needs careful attention. It cannot be easily 
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dismissed as mere conspiracy theory, the usual gambit within modernizing 
circles. 
But one does not in any case need to rely on conspiratorial approaches. As 
many have argued, culturally conservative reactions to the process of 
development have often appeared when powerful, internal or external, forces 
have been able to block more progressive developmental options. This has 
often been an argument used to explain Islamic fundamentalism in countries 
such as Turkey, Iran and Egypt, as well as in the cases of Hamas and 
Hezbollah. Islamic parties have succeeded precisely because they have 
responded to the needs of the losers of modernizing reform18. Often this 
response has been quite material – finding jobs for the unemployed, providing 
income support for widows and so on. The parties have acted as a welfare state 
in embryo. But these parties have also attended to the intellectual and cultural 
needs of those losing out – giving voice to both their anguish and their 
aspirations. 
How do such considerations relate to the dilemmas of the centre-left in Greece? 
The argument is that the modernization critique of populism was, if not deeply 
flawed, seriously incomplete. It delineated a series of attitudes and practices 
that seemed to be blocking Greece’s development. But then, as in Feuerbach’s 
account of criticisms of religion, it assumed that all one had to do was to 
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 For an early instance of this argument see Gilsenan (1990). 
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criticize the irrationality and inefficiency of those attitudes and practices19. 
What was lost in this process was not only the anguish and aspirations that 
populism reflected, but the fact that the latter, albeit in a distorted form, 
encompassed many of the traditional values of the Left. It cannot be said that 
modernizers have a very developed ear for the moral discourse of popular 
engagements with religion, the family and the nation. As Sayer (2005, p. 97) 
has recently argued one needs to understand the moral dimension of social life 
as a source of conformity but also resistance to the existing order. The ‘desire 
for a meaningful collective life’ or the need to ‘counteract the dissolving effect 
of the chaos of individual interests’ would, on the face of it, seem to be 
privileged ground for the Left. To dismiss these babies with the bathwater of 
populism does not seem to offer the grounds for a renewed hegemonic strategy 
for the centre-left. 
Thus, to take just one example, the critique of populism became simultaneously 
a critique of equality and solidarity in the name of meritocracy and 
competitiveness. However this process was undertaken without any 
engagement on the level of values – little time was spent on arguing that 
equality and solidarity should be downgraded as priorities. Correspondingly 
little thought was given to seeing how the aspirations of marginalized groups 
could be channelled into more promising avenues. Modernizers in Greece were 
                                                 
19
 The gains in terms of incomes, pensions and so on of the first PASOK government were real enough 
but this populist episode proved unsustainable in the subsequent period (see Tsakalotos, 1998). At the 
level of rhetoric and symbolism (recognition of the resistance, more independent foreign policy, etc) 
PASOK was able to hold the populist alliance together for longer than the material conditions 
warranted. 
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quick to point out that populist politics articulated demands on the state but 
promoted few concrete policy proposals. This is doubly misleading as a basis 
for an alternative politics. On the one hand, much of the social base of 
populism can be characterised as insecure and lacking in autonomy. This lack 
of autonomy should be understood not in the liberal sense of protection from 
external interventions, but in the fuller sense of stability. As O’Neil (1998) has 
argued, for autonomy to have real meaning people need to have stability with 
respect to their families, jobs and communities - in an unstable environment it 
is very difficult for people to have a ‘narrative continuity’, to give meaning to 
their lives. In this context it is difficult for marginalized groups to engage at the 
level of policy formation and a blunt opposition to reforms that increase further 
the degree of instability seems a quite rational response. On the other hand, the 
modernizers of PASOK gave little time to suggesting alternative policies and 
institutions based on the values of equality, community and solidarity which 
would have given such groups some feeling of control over the issues that 
affect their lives (their schools, their work, public spaces and so on). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Looking at the past and thinking of the future in terms of modernization theory, 
and in particular the distinction between old and new, has led to a multiplicity 
of problems for the Centre-Left in Greece. The increase in inequality is a 
constitutive feature of the neoliberal project entailing not just problems for 
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those uncompetitive groups but the creation of whole new sections of the 
population whose prospects are characterised by poor wages, casual 
employment and uncertainty. In the 2007 parliamentary election PASOK, 
associated as it was in the public mind with support for labour market 
flexibility, had problems in addressing this audience. Having conflated 
neoliberal reforms with the new, PASOK has assumed what in effect has to be 
proved - that there is a viable counterfactual in which pro-market reforms are 
consistent with a better state of the world for its social base. Thinking sensibly 
about this issue is difficult if one accepts the basic modernization premise that 
modernization presents an ethically and politically neutral project, rather than a 
specifically class response with clear winners and losers. 
In this context it comes as little surprise that PASOK, in opposition, has 
organized little opposition to the reforms of ND in the labour market, to the 
privatisation of nationalised industries, or anywhere else for that matter20. 
There was little recognition of the pressing need for collective action and social 
mobilization for defending the social achievements of the past, and blocking 
the right-wing dynamics of politics. A further problem that we have discussed 
is the fact that, far from representing remnants from the past, the rise of 
nationalism and conservative, or even authoritarian sentiments, are fully a part 
of late modernity. Such elements, we have argued, represent the dominant form 
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 In the field of education its appeal to young voters was seriously compromised by its stance in the 
major social mobilization in the election year over the government’s attempt to repeal the article in the 
constitution that forbids private tertiary universities and commits the state to funding university level 
education. While a majority of PASOK students supported the massive, and eventually successful, 
mobilization against the repeal, PASOK was damaged by its support for the “reform”. 
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of incorporation of the losers of neoliberalism but, at the same time, also reflect 
the anxieties and aspirations of marginalised groups in their search for stability 
and security. Here the modernization critique of populism – that had 
incorporated such elements in a previous era – was, to put it no stronger, 
incomplete. For, in rejecting populism, modernizers within PASOK were 
unable to provide any new thinking on how such anxieties and aspirations 
could be addressed. Such thinking is severely impaired by a conception that 
sees collective organization and mobilization as part of the problem rather than 
the solution. 
Both in the economic and cultural domains PASOK thinking has been subject 
to what has been termed ‘cognitive locking’ into a particular problem 
description that makes for only one possible solution21. To take just one 
example, thinking about how to create new bonds of social solidarity, which 
can also promote economic efficiency, disappears even as a question in this 
process. Instead of new thinking on such questions, we have a search for 
importing techniques, policies and institutions from the more advanced 
capitalist societies. History, and the particular characteristics of a society, play 
little role in such a conceptualization, representing merely the “old”. PASOK 
seems to have replaced a third-worldist populism, in which everything from 
abroad was suspect, with a third-worldist modernization, in which nothing 
rooted in society is worth building on. Without recognition of their aspirations, 
and facing an increasingly unequal, uncertain and precarious environment, it 
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 See Blyth (2002, p. 170). 
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hardly comes as a surprise that significant sections of PASOK’s social base 
have abandoned the party. Such a revenge could have been foreseen but for the 
prevalence of modernization ideas. 
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Appendix A: Growth, Employment & Wage-Profit Shares in the 
Greek economy 
As Figure 1 shows, growth in Greece has been consistently and significantly 
above that of the Euro Area since the mid-1990s. However, the impact of this 
on employment rates (the percentage of the population aged 15-64 in work) has 
remained modest and they remain well below the Lisbon Agenda goal for an 
overall employment rate of 70% and a female employment rate of 60% by 2010 
(Figure 2a). In part, as is clear from figures 2b and 2c, low employment rates 
reflect low participation rates (defined as the percentage of the population 
either in work or seeking work). 
Figure 3 illustrates wage and profit shares from 1973 until 2007. It is clear from 
this figure that after a sharp rise in wage shares from 1974 onwards, they 
remained at levels of over 70% of GDP until the late 1980s. During the New 
Democracy government of the early 1990s, the wage share fell sharply. The 
critical factor, however, for the purposes of our argument is that during the 
Papandreou/Simitis government (1994-2000), macroeconomic stabilisation was 
successfully undertaken with a rising wage share; during the second Simitis 
government (2000-2004), it fell. It has subsequently remained at this low level 
during the New Democracy governments. 
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Figure 1: GDP growth - Greece and Euro Area compared
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Source: AMECO database. 
 
Figure 2a: Employment rates
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Source: National Statistical Service of Greece. 
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Figure 2b: Male labour force participation by age group
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Source: National Statistical Service of Greece. 
 
Figure 2c: Female labour force participation by age group
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Source: National Statistical Service of Greece. 
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Figure 3: Adjusted wage and profit shares, 1974-2007
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Source: Own calculations from AMECO database and National Statistical 
Service of Greece. The 2007 figures are based on estimates from Eurostat. 
Note: Wage shares are calculated using the compensation of employees 
(adjusted for the self-employed by imputing a wage using average wages across 
the economy for the self-employed) as a percentage of gross value added. Profit 
shares are gross operating profits (minus the imputed wages of the self-
employed) as a percentage of gross value added.  
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Appendix B 
In Greece, evidence that profits have risen at the expense of wages comes not 
only from evidence of a rising profit share, but also from an increase since 
1990 in the rate of return on capital. As is clear from Figure 4, the rise is 
particularly strong during the second Simitis government. At the same time, 
while the real value of the minimum wage has been rising since the mid-1990s, 
it still lies below that of the early 1980s (Figure 5) and relative to average 
wages in the economy it fell from around 51% of gross average wages in the 
early 1990s to under 42% in 2005. This provides again evidence of the gains of 
growth being unequally shared. 
Figure 4: Net returns on net capital stock (2000=100)
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Source: AMECO database. 
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Figure 5: real value of the minimum wage (2000 
prices)
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Source: National Statistical Service of Greece. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The minimum wage as a percentage of average 
wages. 
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Source: INE/GSEE-ADEDY Report on the Greek Economy, 2006. 
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Evidence on poverty and inequality in Greece provides little comfort. Using 
data from household surveys since 1995 (the European Household Panel 
Survey followed by the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), the risk of 
being poor in Greece has ranged from 20-22% with no discernible trend (the 
risk for the EU-15 lay between 15% and 17%). The same stagnant picture is 
evident from an examination of measures of inequality. The ratio of the income 
of the richest 20% of the population to that of the poorest 20% moved between 
5.7 and 6.6 (compared with levels of between 4.5 and 6.1 for the EU). A 
similar picture of inequality in Greece being high by European standards with 
no evidence of a downward trend is also given by other measures of inequality 
such as the Gini coefficient (see Bank of Greece, Annual Report of the 
Governor (in Greek), Box IV.2, 2006). 
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Appendix C 
The role of deregulation of financial markets should not be underestimated in 
providing support for neoliberal reforms. Increasing financial market 
sophistication has allowed at least some households to borrow thus providing 
significant support for their consumption aspirations even if the income gains 
required to support these aspirations in the long run have not been forthcoming. 
As a consequence many countries have witnessed a decline in household 
savings rates and a rise in debt. This is clearly evident from Figures 7-9. 
On closer inspection, it is the Anglo-Saxon economies of the US and the UK 
which appear to have experienced the sharpest falls in household savings rates 
and the sharpest rises in the household debt burden. This contrasts, for 
example, with the cases of Germany, France and, for the period for which 
figures are available, the euro area as a whole. One factor which might go some 
way to explaining this difference is the fact that the US and the UK have the 
role of international financial centres. This implies that they easily attract funds 
through international markets located in London or New York which can be 
on-lent domestically, facilitating such large build-ups in debt levels. In turn, 
this has facilitated neoliberal projects such as that of Blair by enabling the 
consumption aspirations of the newly-emerging middle class to be realised. By 
contrast, Germany and France which have traditionally had more 
institutionally-based and domestically-oriented financial systems have not been 
able to support the consumption desires of a new middle class to the same 
extent, thus making the implementation of a neoliberal agenda more difficult. 
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The crisis of social democracy in those two countries is perhaps no 
coincidence. 
What does this tell us about the case of Greece? It cannot be denied that 
financial deregulation in Greece has increased the opportunities for borrowing 
(either for house purchase or to consume) much easier. Indeed, as Figure 8 
shows, household savings ratios have been falling in Greece, albeit from much 
higher levels. Bank credit to households has been growing at rates in excess of 
30% per annum. This has led to a build-up of household debt which reached 
44% of GDP at end-October 2007 (still below the euro area average). Results 
of two household surveys conducted by the Bank of Greece (in 2002 and 2005) 
suggest that only about 50% of households in Greece have some kind of debt 
obligation (including loans from friends or other family members). Moreover, 
Symigiannis and Tzamourani (2007) show that the probability of having debt is 
strongly positively related to income. This suggests that, while financial 
liberalisation in Greece has helped to support the emergence of a new middle 
class, a significant proportion of PASOK’s social base has remained unaffected 
– they do not have access to loans. It has not been possible, therefore, to satisfy 
their aspirations by the accumulation of debt as witnessed in the Anglo-Saxon 
economies. 
 
 
  
Figure 7: Household gross savings rate
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Figure 8: Household gross savings rate
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Source: AMECO database. 
Figure 9: Household liabilities/Household Disposable Income (%)
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